The Usual Meaning Of “Arising Out Of One Event” Is Not Altered By A Definition Of “Any One Event” In The Policy Wording

WRBC Corporate Member Limited v. AXA XL Syndicate Limited and Others [2026] EWHC 939 (Comm)

In this case, WRBC, the underwriting member of W.R. Berkeley syndicate 1967 at Lloyd’s for the 2019 year (“the Syndicate”), brought claims against the Reinsurers of two multi-class excess of loss reinsurance treaties (“the Treaties”).  The Treaties were in materially the same terms and placed by brokers Aon and JLT respectively. One of the classes of business protected thereunder was Contingency.  The Treaties ran from 1 April 2019 to 31 March 2020. 

The claims that the Syndicate submitted under the Treaties related to some 174 losses arising on its inward book of Contingency risks in respect of certain conferences, trade shows, exhibitions and other gatherings which were cancelled or postponed, as a result of the Covid pandemic, in seven jurisdictions (England, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Nevada and New York).

There were two principal issues in dispute between the Syndicate and the Reinsurers in respect of these claims: (1) how the Limits clause was to be construed and (2) what constituted the ”event” from which the underlying losses arose, for the purpose of identifying which losses fell to be aggregated under the Treaties.

The construction issue – meaning of the Limits Clause

As to the issue of construction, the Treaties provided an indemnity for the Syndicate’s ultimate net loss, excess of a US$1m deductible, 

“each and every loss any one risk, or each and every series of losses arising out of one event” (“the Limits Clause”).

The Syndicate aggregated together all of the losses in each jurisdiction, so that it was making seven aggregated claims on the Treaties. The Syndicate’s rationale for doing so was that the “event” in question under the Limits Clause was the relevant measure, or group of measures, taken by the authorities in each jurisdiction that caused the conferences etc. to be cancelled.  Thus aggregated, the claims exceeded the deductible.

By contrast, the Reinsurers resisted the claims on the basis that the word “event” in the phrase “arising out of one event” was not to be construed as a causative event such as a covid-related measure taken by the public authorities, but instead imported the definition of “Any One Event” contained in the Definitions section of the Treaties, which was a type of ‘hours’ clause.  The phrase “Any One Event” was defined as meaning,

 “any one Conference or Exhibition or Convention or any other “Event” accepted by the Reinsured including the period of installation or dismantling and arrangements directly connected with the “Event” (“the AOE Definition”).  

Thus the issue was whether (as the Reinsurers contended) the AOE Definition applied to the phrase “one event” in the Limits Clause.  Had it done so, WRBC’s recovery would have been greatly reduced, since the majority of losses from individual cancelled conferences etc. fell below the US$ 1m deductible.

The Judge held that the AOE Definition did not apply and that the Syndicate was correct in saying that “event” in the Limits Clause carried its usual meaning of a causative event that gives rise to losses.  The Judge reached this conclusion primarily as a matter of textual analysis, as the Reinsurers’ construction would have produced numerous oddities in the way the Treaties worked.  The Judge also considered that the contextual matrix – including the history, form and content of the Syndicate’s reinsurance arrangements in previous years, of which the Reinsurers were aware – supported the Syndicate’s interpretation.

The aggregation issue – how the Syndicate’s losses were to be aggregated

As to the approach that should be adopted towards aggregation, the Syndicate argued that there was a single causative event in each jurisdiction which gave rise to all of its losses in that jurisdiction, the causative event being in each case either a combination of Government measures or alternatively a single Government measure restricting large gatherings.  

Significant causal connection required – The Judge accepted that, in principle, a measure which has an impact on the viability or otherwise of a conference or other gathering insured by the Syndicate could constitute an “event” for the purposes of claiming under the Treaties.  However, there must be a “significant”, rather than merely a “weak”, causal connection between the event and the cancellation giving rise to the loss.  The event must be an effective cause of the cancellation, but did not have to be the only or proximate cause.

Combinations of measures – The Judge held that, while it cannot be said that a number of measures can never collectively constitute a single occurrence or event, all depends on the facts.  On the facts, and taking the examples of California and England, he did not accept the Syndicate’s combination argument for either jurisdiction.  This was because the individual measures had a character and importance of their own.  

Therefore, the judge proceeded to identify the effective cause of each cancellation and whether it was a measure that could be regarded as a relevant event within the coverage provided.     

Measures not specifically causing the relevant causative event  – The Judge considered that a state-wide declaration of a state of emergency (or similar) was not a relevant causative event.  He noted that it might have been possible to contemplate that, with the declaration of a state of emergency in relation to a pandemic, further specific measures would follow.  However, that was not sufficient to say that the declaration of a state of emergency was itself a causative event from which everything else followed.  

Further, claims for gatherings which were cancelled following such a declaration, but prior to the first measure which would have actually required the gathering to be cancelled, could not be aggregated by reference to the restriction subsequently introduced.  One reason for making this finding was the principle that a step taken because the occurrence of an insured peril is imminent is not covered unless the subject of the insurance is already “in the grip of the peril”.

The search for the effective cause – The Judge rejected Reinsurers’ case that the measure nearest in time to a cancellation or postponement should be treated as the cause of the loss.  As indicated above, the effective cause of the cancellation should be determined, which might be an earlier measure. Subsequent measures which continued existing restrictions, made trivial changes or relaxed restrictions were not to be regarded as fresh aggregating occurrences.  

Thus, following an analysis of the losses in a particular jurisdiction in the above manner, aggregation was applied in accordance with the Limits Clause where underlying losses arose from the same relevant measure.

Lovetts’ comment

This case confirms that a term such as “event” can have one meaning in one part of an insurance policy and another meaning in another part. Where a word is defined, the question is whether it is apt to use the definition for the purpose of the clause in question.

Meanwhile, the courts approach issues of aggregation by reference to a strict application of the policy wording, in particular, by reference to the degree of causation required, a close analysis of the cause of each loss and careful attention to the precise phrase used for the unifying factor required.

For further information on the issues raised, contact Wendy Miles, Chris Earl-Anderson or William Sturge at Lovetts Solicitors.